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Reviving the Civil Jury Trial:
Implementing Short, Summary, and
Expedited Trial Programs
INTRODUCTION
Civil jury trials are disappearing. In all courts, both state and
federal, there is a decline in both the percentage of cases that go to
trial and the absolute number of trials 1—all while the number of
claims is greater than ever before. 2 The civil jury trial is losing its
place in America’s justice system, with unfortunate consequences:
“The decline in jury trials has meant fewer cases that have the benefit
of citizen input, fewer case precedents, fewer jurors who understand
the system, fewer judges and lawyers who can try jury cases—and
overall, a smudge on the Constitutional promise of access to civil . . .
jury trials.” 3 However, despite the many factors contributing to the
decline, there may be a way to invigorate the civil jury trial and
restore its vital place in America’s justice system.
This Comment proposes the adoption of short, summary, and
expedited (“SSE”) civil jury trial programs in response to the decline
of the civil jury trial. These trial programs are a faster and cheaper
alternative to the traditional jury trial that still retains many of a
traditional trial’s key attributes and benefits. An SSE trial program
encourages the use of a jury, shortens the time between initiating the
lawsuit and a trial, reduces the overall cost of litigation to all parties,
and allows attorneys and judges to gain needed experience—without
burdening the already existing civil justice system or violating the
constitutional promise of jury trials. Unfortunately, few jurisdictions
have implemented these programs, and fewer still have done so in a
1. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004) [hereinafter
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial].
2. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola
University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1405,
1408 chart 1, 1409 chart 2 (2002).
3. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., A RETURN TO TRIALS:
IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE SHORT, SUMMARY, AND EXPEDITED CIVIL ACTION PROGRAMS 1
(2012) [hereinafter A RETURN TO TRIALS]. This report was supported by the American Board
of Trial Advocates and the National Center for State Courts.
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way that supports the traditional jury trial instead of adding yet
another way of avoiding it. Scholarship to date on the topic has yet
to provide a complete model of an SSE trial program that has the
possibility of reviving the jury trial. This Comment remedies this by
proposing a model SSE trial program that incorporates the attributes
necessary to help revive the civil jury trial.
Part I of this Comment describes the importance of the civil jury
trial and the unique benefits that may be lost by its decline. Part II
provides the characteristics of a model SSE trial program that
incorporates these benefits into a new trial procedure that supplements
and strengthens a jurisdiction’s established civil trial system.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL
Our current system of civil trials is not perfect. And the data
suggest that these flaws are contributing to the loss of this valuable
institution. 4 The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
purpose shared by most states’ rules, is to “secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination” of civil actions. 5 Unfortunately,
these goals are all too often not realized. 6 The interrelated issues of
cost, 7 delay, 8 and the potential for unpredictable and unjust jury
4. Many authors and institutions have noted and commented on the worrying
phenomenon of the vanishing civil jury trial. See, e.g., Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra
note 1; Higginbotham, supra note 2; David W. Elrod & Worthy Walker, Fact or Fiction: Are
There Less Jury Trials & Trial Lawyers? If So, What Do We Do About It?, 3 LITIG. COMMENT.
& REV. 53 (June/July 2010); Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts:
1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755 (2004); Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury
Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 191 (2005); Nathan L. Hecht, The
Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends in Texas Courts and an Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEX. L.
REV. 163 (2005); MARC GALANTER & ANGELA FROZENA, POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE,
THE CONTINUING DECLINE OF CIVIL TRIALS IN AMERICAN COURTS (2011), available at
http://poundinstitute.org/docs/2011%20judges%20forum/2011%20Forum%20GalanterFrozena%20Paper.pdf; BOSTON BAR ASS’N, JURY TRIAL TRENDS IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE
NEED TO ENSURE JURY TRIAL COMPETENCY AMONG PRACTICING ATTORNEYS AS A RESULT
OF THE VANISHING JURY TRIAL PHENOMENON (2006), available at http://www
.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/vanishingtrials1006.pdf; Janine Robben, Oregon’s Vanishing Civil
Jury Trial: A Treasured Right, or a Relic?, OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN, (2009), available at
www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09nov/jurytrial.html.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
6. Some of the most common complaints are that our court systems are plagued by
“costs, delay, crowded dockets, and perceptions that the system is random and unpredictable.”
Higginbotham, supra note 2, at 1412.
7. Many argue that trial by jury “has become a system that . . . is simply too expensive
to use.” Brister, supra note 4, at 207. Preparing for and conducting trial is “the single most
time-intensive stage of litigation,” and thus the most expensive, “encompassing between one-
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verdicts 9 often force litigants into alternative methods of resolving
their claims. 10 While the challenges facing the current civil justice
system are undeniable, so are its advantages. The civil jury trial holds
historical and constitutional importance, has a unique ability to
provide meaningful legal standards and a just method of conflict
resolution, and forms the basis for understanding our civil justice
system.
A. An Important Historical and Constitutional Right
The right to a civil jury trial was considered important enough to
be written into the Bill of Rights and most state constitutions. 11
third and one-half of total litigation time.” Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Nat’l
Ctr. for State Courts, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, (Jan.
2013)
1,
7,
available
at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/otherpages/publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx
[hereinafter Estimating]. There are multiple studies that attempt to quantify the costs and
rewards of litigation. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM.
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION, 3 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf; Estimating,
supra. By and large, however, the conclusion is that “[c]ivil litigation has been priced beyond
the reach of most Americans.” Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the
Right to Affordable Justice, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2010).
8. As one scholar noted, “[t]hat the disposition time for too many civil cases that reach
a trial is not ‘speedy,’ or at least not ‘speedy enough,’ will surprise few. Delays have been
characterized as ‘ceaseless and unremitting’ and, as such, present important challenges to the
administration of civil justice.” Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil
Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814 (2000). As Kent Syverud stated,
“We thus have increasingly designed our system to provide incentives, including delay, that
drive almost all to settle.” Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1942 (1997).
9. “[T]here is a perception, on the part of businesses and governments, that there is
less predictability, and greater variance, in the results of fact finding by a civil jury than in
dispute resolution by other methods.” Syverud, supra note 8, at 1943; see also Marc Galanter,
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (1996) [hereinafter
Galanter, Real World Torts] (“[C]ritics claim that jury verdicts are irresponsible and
capricious.”).
10. An in-depth discussion of these and other potential causes of the civil jury trial’s
decline is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the potential causes of the
decline, including the advancement of alternative dispute resolution or greater use of summary
judgment by judges, see Syverud, supra note 8, and Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.?
Can It Actually Happen in America? 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 795, 851–58 (2009).
11. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh
Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2000).
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Both the public and courts should be wary of the loss of a widely
available and efficient justice system, whether by legislation that
limits court access or by the encumbrance of paths that lead to the
courtroom. 12 A system that protects the right of free speech or
religious freedom only for a certain class of people would be
antithetical to our constitutional guarantees of fairness and justice.
Unfortunately, this is often the exact result of our current system of
civil justice regarding the right to a civil trial by jury. 13
To be sure, jury trials have never been the typical method of case
disposition. 14 For many people, including lawyers, 15 a trial is “an
awful contest to be avoided if at all possible.” 16 Trials are adversarial,
recorded, and public; they deprive a litigant of control over his or
her fate, turning it over to a number of individuals he or she has
never seen before. 17 For many, “a trial is [viewed as] a waste of time
and money. And trials are not to be trusted. This is especially true of
trials with juries. Juries are strange, unpredictable beasts.” 18 It should
come as no surprise that many potential litigants and their attorneys
often turn to mediation and settlements, which can provide the
parties with the feeling that they have more control over their case. 19
There is no dispute that attorneys should be “knowledgeable of, and
familiar with, all of these alternative dispute resolution vehicles.” 20 It
12. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (arguing that there exists
“structural due process rights” that guarantee access to a system of laws for the redress of
wrongs—rights that courts are responsible for upholding).
13. See Expedited Jury Trials Secure Americans’ Precious Right to Trial by Jury; PR
NEWSWIRE (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/expedited-jurytrials-secure-americans-precious-right-to-trial-by-jury-219438921.html.
14. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 688, 689 (2004) (“The first point is that the ‘trial’ was never the norm, never the
modal way of resolving issues and solving problems in the legal system. In a way, then, we can
argue that the ‘vanishing’ is an illusion. There was never much to vanish. There never was a
regime of full trials.”).
15. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
16. Terry R. Means, What’s So Great About a Trial Anyway? A Reply to Judge
Higginbotham’s Eldon B. Mahon Lecture of October 27, 2004, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 513,
516 (2006).
17. Id. at 516–17.
18. Friedman, supra note 14, at 694.
19. Means, supra note 16, at 517 (“[W]ho can blame a litigant and his lawyer for
preferring mediation and settlement to the uncertainties of trial—uncertainties that cannot be
avoided in the best courtroom with a great jury, presided over by the best trial judge in the
land.”).
20. G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs, 75
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may very well be true that a jury trial may not be appropriate for
every dispute or every client’s situation. 21 The problem with our
current system arises when litigants are forced into alternative case
disposition methods and cannot choose to exercise their right to a
jury trial. Thus, despite the fact that the jury trial has increasingly
become “the real ADR, a rarely used alternative to mediation and
arbitration,” 22 it should be recognized as a unique and essential form
of conflict resolution in our justice system. 23
The purpose of strengthening and revitalizing the civil jury trial
is not to suggest “that any set of litigants be forced to try a case
when they prefer to settle”; 24 it is to ensure that “our courts are open
and ready, willing and able to try [a] lawsuit if that is what [the
litigant] want[s] to do.” 25 Currently, our courts are only open and
ready to try a lawsuit if the litigant has the resources, time, and
determination to get there. And for many individuals, this is simply
not an option. Too often litigants are barred from entering the
courtroom and are effectively forced to settle a case that should have
gone to trial. 26 Often our current civil justice system allows money
JUDICATURE 34, 35 (1991).
21. “[T]he inefficiency of litigation as a dispute-resolution tool stems largely from the
fact that it is intended to resolve disputes not by locating common ground but by discerning
the truth of the situation. Fact-finding and truth-seeking may not be important in the context
of mutual benefit, but they are an essential part of the equity and fairness principles that shape
the litigation process.” Craig C. Martin, Avoiding the Inefficiency of Litigation, 15 PRETRIAL
PRAC. & DISCOVERY, Spring 2007.
22. Warren Moise, Jury Trials—The New Alternative Dispute Resolution, S.C. LAW.,
May 2010, at 10, 10.
23. See Eisele, supra note 20, at 35 (“There ought to be a place where [justice]—and
that alone—controls and defines the parameters of permissible procedures—where one is not
forced to submit to something less than due process, even temporarily. . . . I do not expect any
to contend that arbitration, or mediation, or mini-trials, or any other ADR is equal to—or
even approaches—the effectiveness of, or I might say the majesty of, a properly conducted jury
or court trial as a fact-finding, truth-determining, justice-producing device.”).
24. Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication
on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 878 (1990).
25. Means, supra note 16, at 521.
26. One study reported that “[m]ajorities of attorneys . . . answered affirmatively when
asked: ‘Does the cost of litigation force cases to settle that should not settle based on the
merits?’” CORINA GERETY, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., EXCESS &
ACCESS: CONSENSUS ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE 9 (2011); see also NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SHORT, SUMMARY, & EXPEDITED: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL JURY
TRIALS 43 (2009) [hereinafter SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED] (“Combined with attorneys’
fees and court costs, litigation expenses often dwarfed the potential damages that a jury might
award, forcing some litigants to settle regardless of the merits of their case or possibly even
forgo filing a claim at all.”).
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and procedure to determine which cases are important enough for a
trial, rather than the merits of the claim or the desires of the
litigants. 27 A civil justice system that provides greater access to jury
trials and grants litigants at least the option of exercising their
constitutional right to a jury trial is vital in order for the system to be
truly just.
B. Creation and Promulgation of Normative Legal Standards
Although there can be no question that trials are often
prohibitively expensive to the litigants involved, in another sense, the
cost of litigation is “incredibly cheap”—at least when compared to a
world without it. 28 A rule of law requires voluntary compliance and,
although “compliance with societal norms must be enforced on
occasion by [the civil justice system] to insure people do voluntarily
comply,” the few instances of enforcement provide the rules by
which others can model their lives. 29 One author said it this way:
We need trials, and a steady stream of them, to ground our
normative standards—to make them sufficiently clear that persons
can abide by them in planning their affairs—and never face the
courthouse—the ultimate settlement. Trials reduce disputes, and it
is a profound mistake to view a trial as a failure of the system. 30

Thus, civil trials serve two purposes: First, they directly resolve a
number of disputes, though the number resolved by trial decreases
each year. Second, “they project the standards and threats that
parties and lawyers use in ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law.’ It is
precisely because courts project such educative and deterrent
messages that parties and lawyers are able to resolve the vast majority
27. Cabraser, supra note 7, at 445 (“[W]e have . . . come to accept all too often that
due process is a commodity like any other. It is there for the buying, by anyone with the means
to do so, and anyone who can afford it may have as much of it as desired. Those who cannot
afford it must do without.”).
28. Judge Randall Rader, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Keynote
Address at the Summit Conference on Intellectual Property, University of Washington: The
Pace and Expense of Litigation in United States Courts (1999), in CASRIP PUBLICATION
SERIES
NO.
5,
July
2000,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/symposium/Number5/pub5atcl1.pdf;
see
also
Brister, supra note 4, at 212 (“The costs of the civil justice system pale in comparison to the
societal costs that would follow if contracts could be broken, torts committed, and life, liberty,
or property taken without any legal consequences.”).
29. Rader, supra note 28, at 3.
30. Higginbotham, supra note 2, at 1423.
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of disputes without burdening the courts.” 31 Even though trials only
determine a small fraction of the total number of disputes, “the
standards enunciated by the judiciary influence not only disputes that
are brought to the courts, but also matters that never reach the
courts. Beyond this, they influence the behavior of actors
throughout society.” 32 Individuals and businesses need the standards
enunciated by courts in order to plan their affairs. Attorneys need the
guidance of trials to be able to calculate the strength and value of a
client’s claim—necessary information regardless of the eventual
method of claim disposition.
The ability of a case to be appealed, something most alternatives
to jury trials lack, 33 adds to the ability of the civil trial system to
establish normative standards. 34 Without numerous cases applying
legal principles to numerous fact scenarios, the legal principle
remains “at a level of generality that erodes predictability of results
and produces random outcomes,” which in turn reinforces the
perception that a civil trial is too unpredictable. 35 As access to the
courtroom is restricted, there are fewer cases, especially at the
appellate level, to guide future behavior and cases, leading to the
conclusion that “doctrine multiplies as decisive adjudication
wanes.” 36 And the individuals bringing the claims that cast the
“shadow of the law,” which influences future actions, choices, and
disputes, do not include those who did not have the resources or
time to pursue their claim. As the system of law affects all members
of society, it should be expected in a democratic society that all
31. Galanter, Real World Torts, supra note 9, at 1101–02.
32. Id. at 1102; see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (describing divorce litigation
as bargaining in the shadow of legal rules); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts,
Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981) (suggesting that the
shadow is cast by cost, risk, and indigenous regulation as well as by formal rules); HERBERT M.
KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY
LITIGATION 30–56 (1991) (describing the nature of the day-to-day negotiation and
settlement of cases in America’s civil justice system).
33. Brister, supra note 4, at 211 (“Private alternatives to trial by jury generally do not
provide for appellate review or modification, even of obvious errors.”).
34. Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (“Most depictions
of appellate courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the creation and refinement of
law and the correction of error.”).
35. Higginbotham, supra note 2, at 1419.
36. Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 1, at 506. “And as the proportion of tried
cases falls, the portion of concluded appeals that are from trials falls and so does the absolute
number of appellate decisions in tried cases.” Id. at 505.
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members of society have the ability to participate in the creation of
that system.
C. Experienced Lawyers and Judges
As fewer cases go to trial, there are fewer opportunities for
lawyers, judges, and jurors to gain experience with trials. This fact is
both a contributing factor in the decline of civil trials as well as an
argument for its preservation. 37 The lack of experience with trials
limits a lawyer’s ability to “(1) objectively advise whether to pursue a
trial or an alternative resolution forum; (2) effectively and efficiently
conduct pre-trial discovery; (3) make accurate ‘jury-value’
predictions; (4) objectively assess a settlement offer; (5) effectively
negotiate the best possible settlement for the client; and, (6)
effectively assist the client in mediation.” 38 The entire structure of
our civil justice system, its procedures, incentives to settle, and the
ethical rules that govern attorney action, is based on a process that
many lawyers seldom, if ever, experience. 39 This lack of experience
with trials can negatively “impact nearly every decision” made by an
attorney outside of the trial. 40
37. Robert P. Burns, Advocacy in the Era of the Vanishing Trial, 61 U. KAN. L. REV.
893, 893 (2013) (“If lawyers increasingly view trials as deviant events, their approach to
litigation cases will itself become one of the causes of the trial’s disappearance.”).
38. Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher J. Bodnar, Honesty is the Best Policy: It’s
Time to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience 4 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 151, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375103.
39. Id. at 10 (“[A] majority of . . . litigators had not tried a single case to a jury until
they had practiced for approximately 7 years.”); McMunigal, supra note 24, at 837 (“Can one
expect lawyers to understand, respect, and adhere to the values of an ethical and legal system
premised, as ours is, upon a process of adjudication lawyers seldom, if ever, experience?”);
Burns, supra note 37, at 895 (“[T]he entire structure of civil procedure has been built up as a
path to an adversary trial . . . . It is hard to understand much of civil practice . . . without
understanding the trial.”).
40. McCormack & Bodnar, supra note 38, at 15. The need for trial experience extends,
in some measure, even to transactional lawyers. See David K. Bissinger & Trent T. McKenna,
Arbitration, Bench Trial, or Jury Trial? A Functional Guide for In-House Counsel, THE
ADVOC., Fall 2011, at 32, 32 (“In truth, the value of arbitration versus court litigation
depends on the case, the facts, and the parties. Moreover, parties typically must decide to
arbitrate at a contract’s inception, when the parties generally expect that their deal will succeed,
not fail. Indeed, the parties preparing the contract predominately use transactional lawyers, not
litigators. As a result, the parties and the lawyers documenting the deal may lack trial
experience that could help make an informed decision.”); Moise, supra note 22, at 12 (“Even
transactional lawyers need to know how things pan out in court, how those documents will be
received by juries and what is admissible at trial.”).
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There are also, of course, significant costs to having an
inexperienced attorney at trial. A “right to a jury trial would be
meaningless” if the attorney cannot effectively represent his client’s
interests. 41 Inexperienced attorneys waste time, increase their client’s
litigation costs, and may effectively deprive their client of his day in
court. Many law firms have recognized this serious issue, establishing
“formal programs under which young lawyers are permitted, indeed
encouraged, to take on small cases” or participate in other training
methods to gain the experienced needed to handle a case at trial. 42
Even though most cases will never go to trial, the fact remains that
the shadow of the civil jury trial influences how disputes are resolved,
and an attorney who has little experience with trials will be at a
disadvantage.
The decline in trials has impacted both sides of the bench. “With
fewer trials there are fewer lawyers with trial experience and,
consequently, fewer judges taking the bench with trial experience.” 43
Where “substantial trial experience” was once a requirement to be a
judge, this requirement “could not practically be enforced today,
given that only prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers regularly try
cases.” 44 This is troubling, considering that trial judges are accorded
a great deal of discretion in court procedures and rulings, and the
“justification of [that] discretion . . . rests on a claim that the trial
judge has special knowledge,” which can only come from a judge’s
“skill and experience.” 45 The lack of trials means that judges take the
bench with little trial experience and little hope of gaining more, as
judges now “conduct trials at only a fraction of the rate that their
predecessors did.” 46 This inexperience calls into question whether
discretion is being (or even can be) exercised properly. The concern
over judicial inexperience may be yet another factor driving potential
litigants away from the courthouse, as a judge that is inexperienced

41. Eisele, supra note 20, at 40.
42. BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 4, at 26–28.
43. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. 745, 755 (2010). Judge Higginbotham also notes that “Federal trial judges selected
today . . . often lack relevant trial experience, thereby reinforcing the need for delegation [of the
judge’s work to magistrate judges, law clerks, and other staff].” Id. at 760–61.
44. Id. at 755–56.
45. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV.1261, 1295 (2010).
46. Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 1, at 460.
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with trials may issue incorrect rulings, forcing a party to decide
whether an appeal is less costly than an erroneous and unjust result. 47
II. REVIVING THE CIVIL TRIAL SYSTEM THROUGH SHORT,
SUMMARY, AND EXPEDITED TRIAL PROGRAMS
A. Overview of Implemented and Proposed SSE Trial Programs
Short, summary, and expedited (“SSE”) trial programs, under
various names, have existed for several years now, but few
jurisdictions have implemented them, and there is no single model
that has been adopted. 48 Generally, these programs are attempts to
provide a faster and less expensive alternative to the traditional jury
trial while still retaining some of the benefits of a jury. Programs vary
widely from one jurisdiction to another with “some courts view[ing]
their program as one of several ADR tracks, while others view it as a
legitimate jury trial.” 49 The goal of the SSE trial program proposed
in this Comment is to establish a program that both functions and is
47. In the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals “reverses more than
30 percent of the patent appeals it hears,” which “high reversal rate is attributable [in part] to
judicial inexperience.” Bruce Moyer, Creating Patent Expertise in the District Courts, WASH.
WATCH
(June
2007),
http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Washington-Watch/WWArchives/2007/June-2007.aspx. This judicial inexperience with patents stems from the fact
that a district court judge only sees a patent case once every seven years. Id. Although district
judges currently try civil cases (of any kind) more frequently than that, if the decline continues,
we may soon approach that result. For example, in 2002 Marc Galanter estimated that there
were around seven civil trials (five jury and two bench) per sitting district judge in that year,
but points out that even that low number overstates the actual number of trials conducted by a
sitting judge. Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 1, at 521–23. And the number of trials
only continues to decrease. See David J. Beck, A Civil Justice System With No Trials: Are We
Sure We Want to Go There?, 76 TEX. B.J. 1073, 1073 (2013) (reporting that in 2010, “Article
III judges tried fewer than four civil jury trials”).
48. SSE trial programs, with different names, structures, and results, have been
implemented in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Texas, South Carolina, and Utah. For some, the program has been implemented
state-wide; for others, like Nevada, only a few judicial districts have adopted the new programs.
RACHEL LITTLE, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY OF
EXPEDITED JURY TRIAL PROGRAMS; GINGER APPLEBERRY ET AL., LOCKE LORD, NEW
EXPEDITED ACTION RULES GO INTO EFFECT IN TEXAS (2013), available at
http://www.lockelord.com/qs_2013newtexas/. This Comment refers to these programs
collectively as “short, summary, and expedited” trial program as that is the name adopted by
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, the American Board of Trial
Advocates and the National Center for State Courts in their report. See generally A RETURN TO
TRIALS, supra note 3. This name also encapsulates the purpose and major features of these trial
programs—short trials, dealing with only certain limited issues, that are heard expeditiously.
49. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 3.
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treated as a legitimate jury trial—a program that supplements, but
not supplants, the existing civil justice system. For such a program to
be successful, it must maintain the benefits of a traditional jury trial
while minimizing the aspects that reduce access, most notably cost
and delay. 50 It also has to integrate into the existing jury trial system
without adding complicated, costly, and time-consuming procedures
to the system, which defeat its purpose. 51
Aside from this Comment, the only major discussion on how an
SSE trial program should be designed is provided by the Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System (“IAALS”), 52 the
American Board of Trial Advocates (“ABOTA”), 53 and the National
Center for State Courts (“NCSC”). 54These organizations released a
joint report proclaiming their “support of existing expedited jury
trial programs” and “encourag[ing] the adoption of similar programs
throughout all jurisdictions.” 55 ABOTA provided a list of five
features of an SSE program that it considered were “critical for
success.” 56 Their goal was to provide a “flexible roadmap” instead of
a “specific set of parameters to be implemented in every program and
for every case.” 57 The features described in ABOTA’s report are
50. Cost and delay have been cited as the motivating factors in those jurisdictions that
have already adopted SSE trial programs. See, e.g., NATALIE BROWN ET AL., COLORADO AT
THE
CROSSROADS: CIVIL ACCESS PILOT PROGRAM
(2011),
available at
http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl_articles.cfm?articleid=6855 (discussing a proposed SSE trial
program in response to a “crisis of cost and delay” in access to Colorado’s civil justice system).
51. A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3, at 6 (“The SSE program should be designed to
address existing obstacles that impede efficient case processing and resolution in that
jurisdiction, but without introducing procedures or requirements that affect otherwise wellfunctioning processes.”).
52. IAALS “is a national independent research center at the University of Denver
dedicated to the continuous improvement of the process and culture of the civil justice
system.” A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3.
53. As stated on their website, “[t]he American Board of Trial Advocates is a national
association of experienced trial lawyers and judges dedicated to the preservation and promotion
of the civil jury trial provided by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. First and
foremost, ABOTA works to uphold the jury system by educating the American public about
the history and value of the right to trial by jury.” AM. BD. OF TRIAL ADVOCATES,
https://www.abota.org/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
54. NCSC “is a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving the administration of
justice by providing leadership and service to the state courts . . . . [and] engages in cuttingedge research to identify practices that promote broad community participation in the justice
system.” A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3.
55. A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3.
56. Id. at 3–4.
57. Id. at 2.
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indeed critical to a successful SSE program, but are insufficient on
their own to establish a program that can truly revive the declining
civil jury trial system.
This Comment provides a model SSE trial program that describes
the specific components and characteristics that an SSE program
should have to increase the chance of reviving the civil jury trial. While
these include the attributes found in the joint report, the Comment
also includes many that were either omitted or described as optional.
To be sure, there are many factors that can and should be considered
in implementing a new trial program; 58 however, this Comment
addresses only those that are essential to creating a system by
legislative or judicial action that supports the traditional civil jury trial.
In reviewing these features, this Comment will draw comparisons
to the Eighth Judicial District of Nevada’s Short Trial Program
(“STP”). 59 The information about the Nevada STP comes mainly
from a report by the National Center for State Courts that describes
in some detail most of the implemented state SSE trial programs. 60
Nevada’s program was chosen due to its established record, positive
acceptance by participants, national public recognition, 61 and
incorporation of the necessary characteristics. Furthermore, in the
Nevada district courts that have adopted the program, the number of
short trials has exceeded the number of traditional trials. This
demonstrates an SSE trial program’s proven ability to strengthen,
supplement, and revive the traditional civil jury trial. 62 Although not
perfect, the Nevada STP is an excellent real-world example of the
capabilities of a properly designed SSE trial program.
58. Such characteristics could include establishing the number of jurors who will serve
and the number required for a verdict, the selection process for the judge or judge pro
tempore, the types of cases that can be heard in an SSE trial, the number and types of motions
that can be brought, and whether there will be limits on the amount of recoverable damages.
See id. at 7, for a list of additional characteristics.
59. This district serves Clark County, which includes Las Vegas and is the most
populous county in Nevada; its civil filings comprise 77percent of all Nevada civil filings.
SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 43 n.27.
60. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26. The description of the Nevada
program is found on pages 42–53 of the report. Further references will be made to the Nevada
Short Trial Rules, abbreviated N.S.T.R.
61. The Nevada short trial program has won the National Achievement Award from the
National Association of Counties as an innovative program that contributes to and enhances
county government in the United States, as well as coming in first place in the 15th Annual
Better Government Competition sponsored by the Shamie Center for Restructuring
Government at the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research. Id. at 51.
62. Id. at 47, n.52.
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B. The Characteristics and Components of a Model SSE Trial Program
1. The program encourages trial by jury
One of the most valuable hallmarks of our current civil justice
system is the availability of a jury. 63 While there are many critics of
this feature,
serious students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their high
regard for the jury as a decision-maker. . . . [R]esearchers concur
that jurors on the whole are conscientious, that they collectively
understand and recall evidence as well as judges, and that they
decide factual issues on the basis of the evidence presented. 64

When compared to bench trials, juries most often rule the same
way as an experienced and competent judge. 65 And juries have value
that goes far beyond dispute resolution. 66 The civil jury is a
competent and fair institution for resolving conflicts, and an SSE
program should encourage its use. 67
The best way to encourage the use of juries is to incorporate
procedures that make it easier and more attractive to do so. In
Nevada’s STP, for example, the judge uses Nevada’s model jury
instructions and the parties prepare evidence booklets containing all
the reports and documentary evidence that will be used at trial. 68
These procedures help simplify the process of using a jury by
allowing the parties to know exactly what the jury will hear, both the
law and the facts, before the trial begins. The booklets in particular

63. Brister, supra note 4, at 212–15.
64. Galanter, Real World Torts, supra note 9, at 1109.
65. Id. at 1110 (“[J]uries decide cases along the same lines as judges. . . . Judges and
juries agreed on liability in seventy-nine percent of the cases.”). Another study concluded that
“unjustified payments [issued by a jury] are probably uncommon.” Mark I. Taragin et al., The
Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 780 (1992).
66. The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1421–22 (arguing that “[e]ven if juries
are imperfect factfinders, they serve and represent other incommensurable values that must also
be taken into account in any comprehensive assessment of the jury system,” as they serve “as a
bulwark against despotism, as a legitimator of trial outcomes, and as a forum for democratic
process”).
67. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 51 (reporting that the use of
juries in short trials has not seemed to “offer a distinct advantage for either plaintiffs or
defendants”).
68. Id. at 44–45. Parties may propose or agree to additions to the standard jury
instructions, which the judge may include. N.S.T.R. 25.
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help the jury to fully comprehend the evidence that will be relied
upon by the parties at trial. 69
Nevada’s STP also allows the parties to choose how many jurors
they want empanelled; the default number is four, but the parties can
stipulate to a six- or even eight-person jury. 70 This encourages jury
use in two ways: First, the default small jury panel decreases the cost
of obtaining a jury. 71 Second, the option of stipulating to a larger
panel alleviates potential fears of excessive and unpredictable results
by a small number of individuals. 72 These features, in conjunction
with the other features described below, make easier and encourage
the use of a jury.
As an SSE trial program encourages and allows for an
abbreviated trial by jury, the procedures that the program
implements cannot violate the Seventh Amendment or its equivalent
in a state’s constitution. These constitutional guarantees have
generally been held to preserve only the “fundamental elements” of
the right to a civil jury, not the “great mass of procedural forms and
details” that accompany the system. 73 The SSE trial program as
outlined is specifically designed for a jury of peers to determine the
facts that lead to an enforceable judgment, the fundamental elements
of a civil jury trial.

69. Chris A. Beecroft, Jr., The Nevada Short Trial Program, NEV. LAW., June 2014, at
21, 22 (reporting that some jurors “commented that, because they received the evidentiary
booklets before the trial, they were completely familiar with the evidence long before they
entered the deliberation room”).
70. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 44 n.32.
71. The jury fees for a four-person jury in Nevada’s program are $160 and “are paid by
the party demanding the jury”. Id. at 45.
72. Smaller jury panels have withstood constitutional attack. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100–01 (1970)) (rejecting
“the notion that the reliability of the jury as a factfinder is a function of its size”) (alterations
and quotation marks omitted). Although constitutional, studies do show that increased jury
size leads to more moderate and predictable results. See, e.g., Jill P. Holmquist, Does Jury Size
Still Matter? An Open Question, THE JURY EXPERT (May 1, 2010),
www.thejuryexpert.com/2010/05/does-jury-size-still-matteran-open-question/; NICOLE L.
WATERS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, DOES JURY SIZE MATTER: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE (2004). Another option is to require that parties have a high-low agreement for
damages in place, as Utah has done, which limits the possibility of wild results from a small jury
as the award has both a ceiling and a floor. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-903(6)(d) & (8).
73. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1947) (“[T]he [Seventh]
Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of the jury trial in only its most
fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details.”) (emphasis added);
see also Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336–37 (2010).
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A jurisdiction that implements an SSE program will want to
ensure that its procedures support this constitutional right. In the
single case that addressed the constitutionality of an SSE trial
program, the plaintiff challenged a statute that required the award of
mandatory, non-binding arbitration to be included in the evidence
presented to the jury during a short trial in Nevada. 74 The plaintiff
argued that this requirement violated his right under the Nevada
Constitution to a trial by jury because it deprived the jury of its
ability to independently determine the facts, including the final
award amount. 75 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this
argument, finding that a mandatory jury instruction explicitly told
the jury not to give the award undue weight and that the jury was
responsible to “arrive at a conclusion based upon [its] own
determination of the cause of action.” 76 This case highlights the
importance of ensuring that the jury is the finder of fact and is
appropriately instructed. By so doing, the SSE trial program upholds,
rather than weakens, a constitutional right to a civil trial by jury.
2. The program can issue enforceable judgments
One of the major differences between a trial and a settlement or
mediation is that a trial results in an enforceable verdict and
judgment. A settlement or mediation agreement, however, results in
merely a contract or promise to pay, which must be reduced to a
judgment through another legal proceeding—adding yet another
step before it can be enforced. As the Fourth Circuit stated:
From the view of the Plaintiffs, a judgment in their favor is far
preferable to a contractual promise by the Defendants in a
settlement agreement to pay the same amount. This is because
district courts have inherent power to compel defendants to satisfy
judgments entered against them . . . but lack the power to enforce
the terms of a settlement agreement absent jurisdiction over a

74. Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 493–95 (Nev. 2009). The plaintiff argued that his
substantive due process rights were infringed “because his case is subject to [short trial]
procedures that cases with amounts at issue greater than [$40,000] are not.” Id. at 495. The
Nevada Supreme Court, applying rational basis review, rejected this argument, finding that the
distinction was a “rational legislative choice because it provides more expedited and less
expensive proceedings for smaller claims, while preserving litigants’ right to a jury trial and
appeal.” Id.
75. Id. at 493.
76. Id. at 494.
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breach of contract action for failure to comply with the settlement
agreement. 77

If the goal is to achieve a stronger, more robust civil jury trial
system, then the methods proposed to strengthen it must have the
ability to issue enforceable judgments. Otherwise, the method is just
ADR with a jury and may become just another time—and money—
consuming step in a drawn-out litigation process. 78 This vital aspect
of an SSE program provides litigants their “day in court.” In the
Nevada STP, the judgment of the judge pro tempore is enforceable,
though it must be approved by a district court judge. 79 In this way,
Nevada’s program allows for enforceable judgments after a jury trial,
entered by a “true” judge, but without the judge being required to
oversee the entire trial. 80
3. The trial itself is short
As noted above, preparing for and conducting the trial takes up a
majority of attorney time invested into any given case. 81 As attorney
time usually drives attorney fees, the trial in an SSE trial program
must be restricted in order to decrease the costs involved. Nevada’s
STP allows fifteen minutes to each party for voir dire and three hours
to each side to present their case. 82 The most important effect of this
restriction is that it eliminates the possibility for long, drawn-out,
and expensive trials. Delay and cost are reduced for all parties.
However, these benefits require attorneys to tightly focus their
77. Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 765 (4th Cir. 2011);
see also Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc., 692 F.3d 1162, 1168 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A judgment is
important . . . because the district court can enforce it. Instead . . . Appellants were left with a
mere promise to pay. If Appellees did not pay, Appellants faced the prospect of filing a breach
of contract suit in state court with its attendant filing fees—resulting in two lawsuits instead of
one.”).
78. Richard A. Enslen, ADR: Another Acronym, or a Viable Alternative to the High Cost
of Litigation and Crowded Court Dockets? The Debate Commences, 18 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10, 13
(1988) (“The Mini-Trial is not a trial at all. . . . It is a settlement device. . . . It is binding on
no one . . . .”); see also Eisele, supra note 20, at 35.
79. This was not always the case. The Nevada Supreme Court chose to implement this
feature in 2008, though its reasons for doing so could not be found. SHORT, SUMMARY &
EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 46. The judge pro tempore’s judgment has almost always been
approved. Id. at 49–50.
80. See infra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of Nevada’s use of judges pro tempore and the
advantages and disadvantages of the same.
81. Supra note 7.
82. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 44.
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arguments on only the essential, contested facts. One judge pro
tempore from Nevada stated that “the time constraints on presenting
a case make short trials even more rigorous than regular jury trials.
Trial lawyers must be more prepared and more focused on essential
trial issues.” 83 An additional benefit of a short trial is that jurors
generally appreciate the ability to fulfill their civic duty within one
day, with less chance of wasted time. 84
There is a due process concern with limiting a party’s time to
present her case. 85 Generally, judicially imposed time limits have
been upheld as a valid exercise of a trial court’s inherent power,
within certain boundaries. 86 In order to satisfy due process, the
parties must have sufficient time for an “efficient, yet effective,
presentation” of their claims. 87 One factor that mitigates this concern
is that parties to an SSE trial know in advance the time constraints
placed on their case and can plan accordingly. The ability of a party
to remove the case to a full trial court, discussed below, 88 may be
essential in ensuring that due process is not violated; if a case is too
complex for a party to effectively present her case within the strict
time limits, she has the option of removing the case to the lessrestrictive trial court.

83. Id. at 50. This statement should not be read to mean that an attorney must spend
more time preparing for an SSE trial as compared to a regular trial—the opposite should be
true. However, due to the time restraints, an attorney must decide well in advance of trial the
issues that are most important and prepare to use every minute wisely, as he does not have the
freedom to cover every issue, ask every question, or describe every piece of evidence.
84. Id. at 48; Beecroft, supra note 69 (“Many [jurors] were so satisfied with the one-day
trial that they said that they would be willing to serve again.”).
85. Another related issue is that SSE programs typically limit the time available for voir
dire, which has been a source of complaints with both Nevada’s and California’s SSE trial
program. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 51; Yixi Cheng, A Law and
Economics Approach to the California Expedited Jury Trials Act 10 (Spring 2012)
(unpublished legal studies honors thesis, University of California, Berkeley), available at
http://legalstudies.berkeley.edu/files/2012/06/Cecilia-Cheng-Sp12.pdf. However, “[t]he
right to voir dire is not a constitutional right but is a means to achieve the end of an impartial
jury.” People v. Boulerice, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citing People v.
Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 681 (Cal. 1989)).
86. See John E. Rumel, The Hourglass and Due Process: The Propriety of Time Limits on
Civil Trials, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 238 (1992).
87. MCI Comm. Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1172 (7th Cir. 1983).
88. Infra Part II.B.10.
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4. The trial date is certain and fixed
One of the most important aspects of an SSE trial program is
that the trial date is set and continuances are rarely, if ever, granted.
This forces the parties to be prepared for the trial on the date for
which it is scheduled. This drives the pretrial process, focuses the
parties on the key issues, and reduces unnecessary expenses. One way
of ensuring that the trial date is fixed is by the use of judges pro
tempore or similar positions. By assigning the SSE trials to
practitioners who don’t have a busy docket to manage, the trial date
is more likely to stay firm and avoids overwhelming trial judges’
dockets. 89 Nevada’s short trials are presided over by judges pro
tempore who “must be active members of the state bar, have a
minimum of ten years of civil trial experience or its equivalent, and
fulfill at least three hours of accredited continuing legal education on
short trial procedures each year.” 90 Nevada’s STP cases are scheduled
for trial within 240 days after the parties’ stipulation to enter the
program. 91 Continuances are rarely granted, though some
defendants, especially those “who view a relative delay in trial as a
strategic advantage in settlement negotiations,” have complained
that scheduling the trial date within six months of the stipulation
moves things too quickly. 92
The advantages of expeditious calendaring gained from using
judges pro tempore or similar positions must be balanced, however,
against the desire to have SSE trials be viewed as “real trials with real
judges.” 93 “Real judges” help reinforce the legitimacy of the SSE
trial program. However, increasing the workload of already busy
judges by assigning them more cases would seem to do little to
89. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermon, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which is
Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176, 199 (1996) (“[T]he actual trial and eventual decision by a
judge are more prone to interruption and delay than the jury process. . . . [T]he irregular or
discontinuous scheduling of trial dates . . . meet[s] the convenience of the judge. . . . [The
delay is] attributed to the diversion of other duties.”).
90. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 46–47. Even though they are
not responsible for trying STP cases, district court judges in Nevada are free to “utilize the
short trial format for any civil case tried” if the parties agree to it, allowing the judges to gain
the benefits and experience of the shorter STP procedures. Beecroft, supra note 69.
91. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 44.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 70. This has been one of the goals of California’s program, but despite the
program’s attempt at legitimacy, it lacks many of the features described in this Comment that
help reduce cost and delay.
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promote the “expedited” part of “short, summary, and expedited.”
Indeed, cases in California’s SSE program, which employs “real judges”
unlike Nevada’s STP, “do not advance through the pretrial phases of
litigation more quickly than non-[SSE] cases and generally do not
receive a calendar preference.” 94 As a result, California’s SSE trial
program does little to reduce the time involved with litigation—a
frequent driving factor of litigation cost. 95 If expediency is a goal of the
program, as it should be, then shifting the burden of trying SSE trials to
non-judges appears to be one of the best means of achieving it.
An additional advantage to having a certain and fixed date is that
some programs, such as Nevada’s STP, allow litigants to know who
their judge will be at the time the trial is set. This helps the
“program achieve[] a level of certainty and predictability that may
not otherwise be available,” 96 helping jury trials shed their reputation
for unpredictability.
5. The program extends to the whole litigation process—not just the trial
Extending the “short, summary, and expedited” nature of the
program to the whole litigation process is often a naturally occurring
result of the two characteristics described above. Keeping the process
firmly set, predictable, and streamlined ensures that a jurisdiction can
“not only decrease the amount of time [and money] involved in
[discovery and trial], but do so without shifting that time [and
money] to other litigation tasks.” 97 When the trial date is strictly set
for the near future, and the attorneys know they are limited in the
time they have to present their case, all pretrial issues become more
focused. Instead of making far-reaching discovery requests, the
parties are incentivized to focus their attention on only the key issues
and to develop their trial strategy as quickly as possible. This reduces
both the cost and the time required to prepare for trial; attorneys do
not need to prepare multiple lines of arguments as they know they
only have a limited amount of time to present their case.
In Nevada’s program, there are three main events to a short trial:
the discovery and settlement conference, which takes place within
thirty days of the appointment of the judge pro tempore (which itself
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
See supra notes 7 & 8.
A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3, at 3.
See Estimating, supra note 7, at 7.
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happens at the time the trial date is set); the pretrial conference,
which takes place no later than 10 days before the short trial; and the
trial. At the first conference, the parties and the judge “confer,
exchange documents, identify witnesses . . . formulate a discovery
plan, if necessary, and . . . discuss the possibility of
settlement . . . .”98 At least seven days prior to the pretrial
conference, the parties must submit the evidentiary booklets that will
be used in trial and a pretrial memorandum that “includes a brief
statement of the claims and defenses; a complete list of witnesses,
including rebuttal and impeachment witnesses; and a description of
their expected testimony, a list of exhibits, and any other matters to
be resolved at the pretrial conference,” including objections to
evidence or potential amendments to the jury instructions. 99 The
judge then rules on any motions or objections at the pretrial
conference, which takes place no later than 10 days before trial. 100
Finally, the trial is held. All of these events, including any discovery,
happen within 240 days of entering the program. This expedited
schedule not only reduces the delay present in traditional litigation,
it also directly reduces litigation expenses as the parties have little
time to conduct extensive discovery or submit multiple motions.
These expedited procedures raise similar due process concerns as
the limitations on a party’s time to conduct a trial; decreasing a
party’s time to fully prepare for his case may impact his ability to give
an effective presentation of his claims. 101 These constitutional
concerns can be avoided by granting parties the ability to remove the
case to the district court, as discussed below. 102 The removal option
both benefits the parties and strengthens the SSE trial program: for
the parties, the district court’s schedule is likely to be less demanding
and more flexible, allowing more time for discovery and other
pretrial activities if it is needed. As to the program itself, requiring
parties to remove their case from the SSE trial program entirely (as
opposed to granting continuances or exceptions to the SSE trial
procedures) preserves the program’s expedited, consistent, and
streamlined nature.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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N.S.T.R. 8.
SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 47–48.
N.S.T.R. 10.
See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.10.
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6. The program relaxes evidentiary standards and encourages issue
agreements and evidentiary stipulations
While most SSE trial programs state that the normal rules of civil
procedure and evidence apply, many have provisions that relax those
rules in limited ways. 103 The multi-institutional joint report
supporting SSE trial programs encouraged “relaxed evidentiary
foundational standards” to “save time and narrow the focus to the
key issue(s)” involved. 104 In Nevada’s program, the judge pro
tempore admits all “report[s], document[s], [and] other item[s] into
evidence without requiring authentication or foundation by a live
witness,” unless there is an objection about the evidence’s
authenticity. 105 These items, which include expert witness reports,
are then incorporated into the evidentiary booklets once the judge
has ruled on any objections. 106 By lowering the standards and relying
on documentary evidence, parties do not have to spend time and
money preparing live witnesses—including expert witnesses—and
can focus on only the disputed issues. Each side is incentivized to
stipulate, or at least not object, to the other side’s evidence.
One disadvantage of such relaxed standards is that they may not
fully prepare attorneys for non-SSE trials, which have more
procedural requirements and stricter evidentiary standards. Even so,
“several experienced trial attorneys and judges pro tempore
described the educational benefit of the short trial program,
especially for younger lawyers who may lack opportunities to try
comparatively low-risk cases to a jury.” 107 A Nevada district court
judge who had both litigated and judged STP trials “claimed that he
liked to do short trials both to keep his trial skills sharp for highervalue cases and to experiment with new trial techniques in lower-risk
cases.” 108 Another judge pro tempore actually stated that STP trials
are “even more rigorous than regular jury trials.” 109 While SSE trials
may not be perfect in terms of preparing attorneys to negotiate the
103. See, e.g., N.S.T.R. 1(c) (“The Nevada Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure apply
in short trials except as otherwise specified by these rules.”).
104. A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3, at 3.
105. N.S.T.R. 17.
106. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
107. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 50.
108. Id. It should also be noted that many newly elected district court judges in Nevada’s
Eighth Judicial District gained experience as judges pro tempore. Id. at 47 n.53.
109. Id. at 50.
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full set of evidentiary and procedural rules, practitioners and judges
agree that some court experience is better than none.
7. The program is typically voluntary but, if mandatory, is structured to
avoid constitutional issues
In spite of the fact that “voluntary processes are often slow to
catch on,” the joint report states that the voluntariness of an SSE
trial program is a critical characteristic of such a program; indeed,
voluntary programs seem to be the majority approach, and for good
reason. 110 An SSE trial program is meant to protect an individual’s
right to choose to resolve his dispute through a jury trial. Allowing
the process to be voluntary (i.e., requiring the parties to stipulate to
its use) preserves the right of the litigants to decide what method is
appropriate for their dispute. This is important, as “reduced cost and
delay, however desirable in their own right, cannot be counted on to
increase litigant satisfaction and to enhance feelings of procedural
justice.” 111 One goal of implementing an SSE trial program is to
enhance the respect and reputation of the civil justice system.
Forcing litigants into a program they do not want does little to
further that goal. This feature also helps strengthen the program
against potential due process and equal protection claims. 112 When
the SSE trial is a wholly voluntary process, the parties waive any
potential constitutional issues. 113
110. A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3, at 4; SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra
note 26, at 83.
111. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of the
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 984 (1990).
112. Mandatory SSE trial programs could arguably violate due process, as they impose
restrictions on how a party can present their case; however, these restrictions may be justified
by the fact that SSE trials are designed for simpler, lower-value cases. See Niki Kuckes, Civil
Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (2006) (quoting Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“[A]t a minimum [Due
Process] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (emphasis added)).
Equal protection concerns are raised if a certain class of plaintiffs, such as those with small
amounts in controversy, is required to be subject to the restrictions of an SSE trial court.
Similar distinctions, however, have withstood constitutional attack in the context of mandatory
arbitration. See William P. Lynch, Problems with Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration:
Illustrations from the New Mexico Experience, 32 N.M. L. REV. 181, 194–95 (2002) (reporting
that New Mexico courts have rejected equal protection claims that the programs “arbitrarily
assign cases to mandatory arbitration based on the amount or the subject matter of the case”
after applying a rational-basis standard of review).
113. See Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (noting that the parties could
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Jurisdictions, however, also have good reason for making SSE
trials mandatory for certain litigants by, for example, requiring all
litigants with cases worth less than $50,000 to participate. 114
Mandatory participation allows a jurisdiction to clear a large number
of cases on a district court’s docket quickly 115 and avoids the
problem that “voluntary processes are often slow to catch on.” 116
However, if the program is mandatory, it is more likely to come
under constitutional attack.
There is a middle ground, as demonstrated by Nevada’s STP.
Nevada’s program allows litigants to opt into the program by
choosing it in place of mandatory arbitration (required for cases
under $50,000) or waiting nearly four years for a traditional trial; the
STP program is mandatory, however, for litigants who appeal a
decision made in mandatory arbitration. 117 The advantages of
decreased cost and delay are weighed against the limitations of the
STP, allowing most litigants the choice of the option that best fits
their situation. 118 This system seems to have worked, as the STP
program has become fairly well known, used, and liked by attorneys
and judges.
A jurisdiction has a choice of where to fall on the
voluntary/mandatory spectrum: it can make the SSE trial program
voluntary, thus potentially helping to increase its reputation; it can
require the program’s use by certain litigants, thus clearing court
dockets of small cases and forcing the adoption of the program; or it
can fall somewhere in between those two options, attempting to gain
the benefits of both. Ultimately though, if the program is mandatory
to some degree, either by allowing a plaintiff to unilaterally bring suit
waive their right to a jury trial).
114. It does not appear that any state or jurisdiction has adopted a strictly mandatory
program.
115. Nevada’s program reported that “the short trial program . . . relieves the district
court judges of routine case management for a sizeable portion of their civil dockets.” SHORT,
SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 50.
116. A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3, at 4.
117. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 44. The STP program is
required before trial de novo. Id. However, “the parties can opt out of the STP by timely filing
a demand for removal and paying an opt-out fee” even when appealing a mandatory arbitration
award. Beecroft, supra note 69.
118. Although the majority of Nevada’s STP cases are appeals from mandatory
arbitration (and so are required to enter the STP program), there is a significant number of
cases—almost one-seventh of all STP cases—that were stipulated into the program, showing
that the program is catching on. Beecroft, supra note 69, at 23.
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in an SSE trial court, by requiring participation based on the amount
in controversy, or, like Nevada, by requiring participation in place of
some form of mandatory alternative dispute resolution, an
implementing jurisdiction should guard against potential
constitutional concerns by allowing the parties a restricted ability to
remove the case to a trial court. 119
8. Litigants have at least a limited right of appeal
As already discussed, one of the values of the civil justice system
is that participants have the ability to participate in the creation and
promulgation of legal standards. 120 Allowing litigants to appeal
judgments or procedural errors allows the SSE trial program
participants to be fully engaged in the civil justice system. The ability
to appeal “protects both private litigants and the justice system as a
whole.” 121 As the SSE trial program will likely be a new feature to a
jurisdiction’s civil justice system, the appellate courts will be “needed
to announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of decision employed
by the legal system.” 122 This may be especially important if the judge
presiding over the SSE trial is not a traditional trial court judge, as
with Nevada’s use of judges pro tempore. 123 Such judges often have
less experience and training and may thus have greater need to be
corrected more frequently. Allowing parties to appeal helps to
legitimize and protect the integrity of the new program and indicates
that SSE trials are not inferior or second-rate trials, but full trials that
grant the same important protections and privileges to the litigants
as a traditional trial before a district judge.
Allowing SSE trial litigants access to an appellate court requires
two things: First, the trial must be on the record. While this may
increase the cost of running the program, 124 it also helps legitimize
119. See infra Part II.B.10.
120. Supra Part I.B.
121. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1219
(2013).
122. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON
APPEAL 3 (1976); see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The
Case for Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 445, 455 (2012) (“The classic remedy for
inconsistent application of the law is appellate review.”).
123. As discussed, Nevada’s STP has opted to allow experienced litigators who meet
certain requirements to act as judges pro tempore. See supra Part II.B.4; SHORT, SUMMARY &
EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 46–47.
124. Though the cost can be shifted to and borne by the parties. See infra Part II.C.1.

974

DO NOT DELETE

951

5/22/2015 3:52 PM

Reviving the Civil Jury Trial

the program by making it more similar to traditional civil trials.
Second, the jurisdiction must determine what issues may be
appealed. The best way to legitimize an SSE trial program is to allow
the same right of appeal as a traditional trial. 125 Nevada’s STP has
gone this route, granting participants the same rights of appeal as
litigants in cases before a district judge. 126 The appeal goes directly to
the Nevada Supreme Court, though it appears that few litigants have
availed themselves of this opportunity. 127
Such a full right of appeal does have the potential to introduce
unnecessary costs and delay into an SSE program, allowing a party to
put off the enforcement of the judgment. In contrast to Nevada,
Utah’s SSE trial program has opted for a limited right of appeal. The
only issues that may be appealed are instances of judicial or juror
misconduct, corruption, fraud, or the correction of errors of law. 128
The benefit of a limited right of appeal is that it keeps the cost and
length of the litigation process down—one of the central features of
an SSE program. 129 Either system would be appropriate, as both
systems allow appellate courts to correct “obvious error” and to
review and promulgate legal principles and standards. While
Nevada’s program has the most legitimacy, Utah’s system may be
the more pragmatic option as it helps reduce the cost and delay of
reaching a final verdict.
9. The program limits the recovery of fees and costs
An SSE trial program principally relies on the time restraints to
control costs. The structure of the program drives the parties to
stipulate to all but the key issues, limiting the amount of work that
needs to be done by attorneys. In addition to these structural
limitations, the SSE trial program should have rules restricting the
amount of attorney fees and court costs that can be recovered from

125. This also helps alleviate fears of using an untested, new program as a party knows
that they can appeal any procedural or legal error.
126. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 45.
127. Id. at 49 & n.65 (reporting that the researchers only found two cases involving an
appeal from short trials).
128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-906.
129. It should be noted that appeals, while adding considerable time to litigation, may
not add a great deal more cost. See Estimating, supra note 7, at 2, 6 (finding that postdisposition billable time, including various post-trial motions and appeals activity, typically only
took up 7–9% of total litigation hours spent on a case).
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the other party under existing rules. 130 These caps supplement the
structural limitations on costs, as parties know in advance that they
will likely not be able to recover all of their litigation costs from the
other party. By imposing recovery caps, parties are incentivized to
limit the amount of discovery, the number of expert witnesses, and
the amount of time spent preparing for trial to only that which is
needed to litigate the essential issues.
The Nevada STP restricts recoverable fees and costs to $3,000
per side. 131 It also places a cap of $500 per expert on the amount of
recoverable expert witness fees. 132 These limitations have reportedly
increased the ability of plaintiffs to bring lower-value suits with less
risk; plaintiffs know that they will only be responsible for paying their
attorney and at most a limited amount to the other side if they lose.
Some Nevada defendants have complained about the attorney fee
cap, saying that it restricts their ability to fully develop their defense
strategy, especially when the plaintiff can establish a contingency fee
arrangement. 133 Admittedly, such caps often work more to the
benefit of plaintiffs than defendants. 134 It should be noted, however,
that most of the attorneys for the defendants participating in
Nevada’s program were salaried attorneys for insurance companies,
which reduces the potential expenses incurred for attorney fees. 135
Although there has been at least one challenge to the limits,
“concerns that litigation costs be minimized to the greatest degree
possible have kept those proposals at bay.” 136
10. Litigants have a limited ability to remove or transfer to a
traditional trial court
There may be instances where a party initially elects or is forced
to resolve a dispute within the SSE trial program that is not fit for
the program. It may be that the issues are too complex for the

130. This model does not propose to include any new fee-shifting provisions, only a cap
on the amounts that can be recovered under existing provisions.
131. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 45.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 52.
134. Id. (“[T]he general consensus among stakeholders was that this feature had little
detrimental impact on attorneys and a fairly significant upside for the plaintiffs.”).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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limited time available in a one-day SSE trial 137 or the parties need
more time prior to trial to prepare their case. 138 In order to address
this issue, a jurisdiction that chooses to adopt an SSE trial program
should also adopt a mechanism by which a party can remove or
transfer the case to the traditional trial court. If a jurisdiction has
opted to make participation in the SSE trial program mandatory, this
feature helps avoid unfairness and injustice by allowing the
disadvantaged party or parties to have their case heard before a
traditional trial court.
As an example, the Nevada STP allows for removal upon
payment of a $1,000 fee. 139 This limitation is not without
controversy, as some parties “argued that it was unfair to impose an
additional $1,000 expense on parties who want a full jury trial before
a district court judge and without the procedural restrictions.” 140 On
the opposite side, others “argued that eliminating the opt-out fee
would undermine the legitimacy of the short trial program by
making it appear to be a second-class, albeit faster, alternative . . . . It
would also provide a means for parties seeking delay for strategic
reasons to achieve that objective.” 141 Other jurisdictions, such as
Utah, have allowed for transfer upon a showing of “good cause.” 142
Regardless of the method chosen, it is important to limit the abilities
of a party to unilaterally force another party into a more expensive
and slower process. This helps limit some undue settlement leverage,
one of the issues the SSE trial program attempts to prevent. 143 The
restriction on removal should not be so great, however, that it
effectively forecloses removal—otherwise, the benefits of removal are
lost and constitutional issues may arise, especially if participation is
mandatory.

137. See supra Part II.B.3.
138. See supra Part II.B.5.
139. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 46.
140. Id. at 52.
141. Id. at 53.
142. UTAH
CODE
OF
JUD.
ADMIN.
4-501(1),
available
at
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/ch04/4-501.htm.
143. Of course, limiting the availability of the traditional trial court may also provide
settlement leverage to the party that wants to stay in the SSE trial court.
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C. Potential Structural Issues with Implementing an SSE Trial
Program
While the programs already implemented have been wellaccepted, successful implementation of a new SSE trial program will
require overcoming several challenges. The joint report describes and
offers advice regarding several challenges that such a program may
face, such as the need to get “buy-in” by both the legal and nonlegal community, the need to avoid the potential for malpractice
suits, and the need to provide for ongoing review of the program to
ensure it continues to address the jurisdiction’s needs. 144 There are
two additional concerns that an implementing jurisdiction may have:
first, whether the program will increase costs to tax-payers and strain
judicial budgets; second, whether the availability of “cheap lawsuits”
will encourage a new wave of litigation, including increased numbers
of frivolous lawsuits. The first issue can be ameliorated by proper
structure; the second, in light of the goals of an SSE trial program, is
not truly an issue at all.
1. Potential costs to the public and judiciary
It is possible for an SSE trial program to be self-sustaining,
allowing greater access to the courts without the need for additional
taxes or appropriations from the court budget. Nevada’s STP is an
example of an SSE trial program that is both self-sustaining and has
actually reduced the cost to the public and the judiciary. As district
court operations in Nevada are paid by tax revenues, cases that are
resolved through the STP reduce the cost to taxpayers by requiring
the parties to bear the cost of the trial. 145 The judiciary has approved
the program as it has “relieve[d] the district court judges of routine
case management for a sizeable portion of their civil dockets,
permitting them to concentrate on more complex cases requiring
more individual attention.” 146 As reported by the first administrator
of the Nevada STP, “Since STP trials cost virtually nothing and
conclude in no more than a day, the program has saved judges 2,350
judicial days and the taxpayers almost $6 million.” 147

144. A RETURN TO TRIALS, supra note 3, at 8–11.
145. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 46.
146. Id. at 50.
147. Beecroft, supra note 69, at 22.
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The fees for Nevada’s program are all covered by the participants
in the program. The STP is administered by the Office of the ADR
Commissioner, which is funded by a $15 filing fee for both
complaints and answers. 148 The jury fees of $160 are paid by the
party demanding the jury. 149 The fee for the judge pro tempore,
$150 per hour up to a maximum of $1,500, as well as up to $250 in
reimbursable expenses, is split between the parties. 150 The judge’s
responsibilities include leading the discovery and pretrial
conferences, conducting the trial, and filing the requisite paperwork
with the district court. It does not appear that Nevada’s
implementing counties have had difficulty in finding attorneys to
take on the responsibilities of a judge. In fact, many of the new
district court judges were elected to the bench after litigating STP
trials and acting as judges pro tempore, suggesting that the program
has had the additional benefit of helping future judges gain more
trial experience. 151 The only issue that Nevada’s STP has struggled
with is the availability of courtrooms, which, as the program
becomes more popular, is becoming a greater issue. 152 The fact that
this is the most concerning issue facing the program is indicative of
its success and popularity.
2. Potential flood of litigation
Another concern that may hinder the implementation of an SSE
trial program is that the availability of a cheap lawsuit may lead to a
flood of litigation. 153 This is potentially problematic in two ways:
first, by overloading already busy courts; second, by increasing the
number of meritless claims filed. The answer to the first concern is
that, as described above, the SSE trial program can be designed to be
self-sustaining. These cases do not add to the trial court’s busy
148. SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED, supra note 26, at 46.
149. Id. at 45.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 47 n.53. These judges in turn are a source of support to Nevada’s SSE trial
program as they understand the program and encourage its use. Id.
152. Id. at 51 (“The ADR commissioner reported that the demand for short trials greatly
exceeds available space in which to conduct the trials . . . . He did not, however, foresee a
remedy for courtroom shortages in the near future.”).
153. Some commentators have noted that reducing delays in litigation may only result in
increasing the demand for litigation by reducing parties’ incentives to settle. Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 130–31
(2003). Presumably, the same may be true for reducing litigation costs.
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calendar as the program can operate almost completely independent
of the trial court. The Nevada STP only requires that the district
judge be involved to approve the final judgment. Otherwise, the
judge pro tempore has all the other powers normally granted to the
district judge and can resolve and rule on all other matters and
motions. 154 Furthermore, the program has actually reduced the
number of cases handled by the district courts. There is little need to
worry about a flood of litigation when the litigation pays for and
takes care of itself.
The second concern is the fear is that by opening the courtroom
doors to deserving litigants with meritorious claims, other litigants
with meritless claims will also enter. This concern cannot be entirely
assuaged as there is always the chance that a plaintiff will bring a
frivolous suit, even in a traditional trial court. The programs do have
built-in safeguards, such as requiring litigation costs to be split
between the parties, as well as the other protections available in
traditional trial courts, such as motions to dismiss (which are still
ruled on before trial) or for sanctions. It is important to remember,
though, that the purpose of an SSE trial program, as described, is to
encourage parties to avail themselves of a civil jury trial—such a
program opens the courthouse doors for people to bring their
dispute to the courthouse, people who could not, or would not,
choose to do so before. These programs are designed help revive the
civil jury trial; an SSE trial program that does not encourage trials
has, quite simply, failed its purpose. “[C]ivil disputes must be
resolved somewhere,” and there is no reason to avoid implementing
a program that can make that resolution easier, cheaper, and fairer
for a number of individuals. 155
In terms of numbers, Nevada’s STP “conduct[s] more than 100
short trials” each year, most of which come from appeals from
mandatory arbitration decisions. 156 This number is still only a
fraction of the total number of STP cases filed each year, as 80
percent of STP cases settle, “ostensibly due to the relative speed and
certainty of the trial date.” 157 Thus, even though the program allows
for greater access to a jury trial, most litigants still opt to settle their
case. Another study, analyzing California’s SSE trial program, found
154.
155.
156.
157.
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that there was actually “a decrease in litigation intensity in the
affected case categories,” with the program “[giving] rise to a
reduction in resolution time, whether by trial or settlement,” and
that automobile cases in particular “tend[ed] to settle faster” after
the program was implemented. 158 These programs, while
encouraging litigants to exercise their right to a jury trial, do not
seem to create an overwhelming flood of litigation. Weak claims are
likely to be dismissed or settle before trial, just as with traditional
litigation. SSE trial programs provide a cheaper and faster alternative
to traditional litigation to parties who cannot or choose not to
resolve their disputes any other way.
III. CONCLUSION
The decline of the civil jury trial is a worrying phenomenon for
many reasons, from the historical and constitutional importance
placed on the civil jury trial to its unique ability to provide
meaningful legal standards and a fair method of conflict resolution.
High costs and long delays are serious challenges in our current
system and need to be addressed. One part of that should be the
implementation of short, summary, and expedited civil jury trial
programs. SSE trials, if modeled as described, are legitimate jury
trials that minimize the costs and delays associated with traditional
jury trials while still retaining their irreplaceable benefits, the most
important being the value placed on a jury to render a just verdict.
These trials are not for all cases, but for many lower-stakes or lesscomplex disputes they can increase access to the court. These
programs are self-sufficient, efficient, and effective. Implementing
SSE trial programs can help revive the civil jury trial, restore faith in
America’s system of civil justice, and reopen the doors to
courthouses that have long been closed to far too many individuals.
Robert A. Patterson*

158. Cheng, supra note 85, at 50, 52. The study also found that attorneys and judges
lauded the program “for its ability to reduce time and monetary costs” while supporting the
value of the jury trial. Id. at 51.
* J.D. Candidate, April 2015, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. The
author would like to thank Professor Aaron L. Nielson for his assistance with this Comment.
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